

Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization into Democratic Governance.

Tina Freyburg*

*Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, Switzerland & European University
Institute (EUI) Florence, Italy, freyburg@eup.gess.ethz.ch

Originally published as Freyburg, Tina 2011: Demokratisierung durch Zusammenarbeit? Funk-
tionale Kooperation mit autoritären Regimen und Sozialisation in demokratischem Regieren, in:
Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 18: 1, 5-46. Reprinted with permission from Zeitschrift
für Internationale Beziehungen.

..

DOI: 10.1515/1935-6226.1110
Produced by De Gruyter.

Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization into Democratic Governance.*

Tina Freyburg

Abstract

Is functional cooperation with authoritarian regimes a blessing or a curse for democratization? Scholars predominantly view cooperation with authoritarian regimes as counterproductive in terms of democratization because it helps the incumbent government to remain in power by stabilizing the regime. This article presents evidence to suggest that functional cooperation can also be considered a promising way of yielding subtle processes of democratization that have hitherto been overlooked. It explores to what extent state officials become acquainted with democratic governance by participating in transgovernmental policy networks, notably the Twinning Program, set up by the European Union in order to implement functional cooperation with its Southern neighborhood. The study conducts regression analyses based on original survey data on Moroccan state officials' attitudes toward democratic governance and complements these analyses with a qualitative comparison of different networks. The findings corroborate an optimistic reading of functional cooperation. By significantly shaping the attitudes toward democratic governance of involved state officials, cooperation appears to be able to plant seeds of change inside authoritarian regimes.

KEYWORDS: Arab authoritarian regimes, democratic governance, democratization, European Union, functional cooperation, international socialization

*An earlier version of this article was awarded with the 2011 EUSA Best Conference Paper Award, the 2011 ISA Carl Beck Award, and the 2010 ECPR-SGIR Best Graduate Student Paper Award. I cordially thank, in particular, Stefanie Bailer, Tobias Böhmelt, Tanja Börzel, Sandra Lavenex, Janine Reinhard, Solveig Richter, Frank Schimmelfennig, Guido Schwellnus, Judith Vorrath, Rebecca Welge, Thomas Winzen, Jonas Wolff, the three anonymous reviewers, and the ZIB editorial team for helpful comments. I would also like to express my gratitude to the numerous European and Moroccan officials who enabled this study, and to the staff of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Rabat for their hospitality. Financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) in the framework of the National Centre for Competence in Research (NCCR), 'Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century' is gratefully acknowledged.

Introduction

In light of the resilience of stable authoritarian regimes, a new line of research warns that the global waves of democratization may have ebbed away. Scholars have consequently started to explore determinants of ‘authoritarian consolidation’ (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Göbel and Lambach 2009; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Leib and He 2006). In this perspective, the capacity to maintain authoritarian rule without resorting to coercion but with a certain degree of responsiveness to domestic problems is considered key to the survival of non-democratic regimes. Authoritarian rulers are particularly interested in coping with social and economic grievances as these are perceived as threats to the regime’s stability. Problems of governance provide incentives for opening up to functional cooperation with economically and politically liberalized countries, hoping for effective solutions to current challenges. Drawing upon this, problem-specific cooperation is considered counterproductive in terms of democratization because it helps authoritarian regimes to remain in power by generating output legitimacy and preserving regime stability (Harders 2008; Schlumberger 2006; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004).

This article takes a different view by considering functional cooperation as staging a site of socialization. Rather than exploring the effect cooperation might yield at the level of the regime, it wishes to open the black box of micro-processes in action where cooperation is actually implemented. More precisely, this article looks at transgovernmental networks which implement functional cooperation between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. It examines the effect of participation in these networks on the attitudes of the state officials involved toward democratic governance. The focus on socialization separates attitudes from behavior. This allows a statement to be made as to whether functional cooperation can induce attitude change toward democratic governance, even if it has not translated into effective regime change. The results reveal that functional cooperation indeed yields subtle processes of democratic socialization that have hitherto been disregarded. In light of the ongoing debate about whether a strategy of isolation or one of rapprochement should be pursued by the international community when dealing with non-democratic states, the findings highlight the importance of improving our knowledge of the indirect effects of functional cooperation.

The potential democratizing impact of functional cooperation is examined in an empirical study of Arab state officials that are/were involved in transgovernmental policy networks set up and financed by the European Union (EU) in the framework of its association policy toward the Southern neighborhood. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) aims to approximate legal and bureaucratic standards in neighboring countries to those of the Union as

a means to manage interdependence and foster integration below membership at the level of sectors (Freyburg *et al.* 2009). Albeit cooperation predominantly focuses on the export of substantial rules, these standards incorporate procedural elements of democratic governance since they were developed for EU Member States that are established democracies. These procedural rules can find their way into administrative practices and legal provisions as a consequence of cooperation. The actual work of implementing functional cooperation is done in transgovernmental networks that bring together specialists from both established democratic and non-democratic countries. While participating in the activities of these networks, state officials employed in a non-democratic polity may become acquainted with democratic principles of decision making. In this vein, cooperation can unleash the potential for subtle democratization processes that are initially quite autonomous from regime-level democratization. In the long run, however, democratization of administrative governance may potentially spill over into the general polity. When bureaucratic and societal actors become acquainted with democratic norms and practices and begin to implement them and make a claim for them in the administrative reality, it might prompt a dynamic creating a demand for far-reaching democratization of the entire political system.

In order to scrutinize democratic socialization through functional cooperation, an approach is adopted that is empirically and methodologically innovative. Empirically, it enriches research on socialization by exploring the argument in a novel context. Existing research largely concentrates on processes that either occur within international and regional organizations (Kerr 1973; Checkel 2003; Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; Scully 2005) or are triggered by them, predominantly in Central and Eastern Europe after the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (Flockhart 2004; Gheciu 2005; Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006). The present study endeavors to introduce functional cooperation as a site of socialization into trans-national norms. It takes transgovernmental networks that are created to implement the EU's reform policy toward its Southern neighborhood as its example. At the time of this study most countries in the regions of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) display a unique combination of authoritarianism and strong statehood that makes them "least-likely" cases for efforts to promote successful democracy from the outside. Hence, the attitudes of domestic actors toward democratic governance are likely to be negative, and the potential effects of democratic socialization can be better differentiated from domestic trends since these effects are unlikely to happen in the absence of external influences. Methodologically, this study invests in directly examining attitudes rather than inferring them from behavior. To this end, it develops an original scale that measures the degree of agreement with democratic norms of governance, and explores self-collected data based on an original survey among 150 Moroccan state officials. Interpretation of the regression results is

strengthened by data collected on the basis of 69 interviews that I conducted with governmental and non-governmental policy-makers, Commission officials, representatives of international organizations, journalists, and scientists in Morocco, Berlin, Vienna and Brussels in 2007 and 2008.

In the first section I develop the theoretical background to the link between functional cooperation and democratic socialization. In the subsequent section the methodology is specified. Section three provides empirical evidence for the argument and explores the conditions under which democratic socialization can be observed. The results support the argument that functional cooperation with authoritarian regimes can have a democratizing side effect on the attitudes of the domestic actors involved.

THEORY: Democratic Socialization and Functional Cooperation

Research on international socialization can be classified along three axes: the role of international institutions in socialization, the substance and then the target of socialization. First, whereas some scholars see institutions primarily as norm promoters trying to influence the preferences and attitudes of actors with the help of various instruments and strategies (Risse *et al.* 1999; Finnemore 1993), others follow a more structuralist perspective (Checkel 2005); they consider institutions as sites of socialization in which participating actors internalize trans-national norms as a consequence of social interaction and cooperation (Johnston 2001). Second, socialization itself refers to the process of inducting those being socialized into trans-national norms such as human rights (Risse *et al.* 1999) and democracy (Flockhart 2004; Gheciu 2005), but it can also concern the actors' identities. In the latter case, scholars' main question is in what way membership of an international organization matters, in the sense that being part of the respective organization becomes a factor for identity building (Hooghe 2005; Scully 2005; Kerr 1973). Third, socialization can be conceptualized at both the macro-level of states and state governments and the micro-level of individuals, such as members of a parliament or as national representatives of international organizations.

Whereas studies viewing institutions as promoters largely concentrate on socialization into the trans-national norms of states, the other strand of research that refers to institutions as sites of socialization predominantly examines the transformation of the identity of individuals delegated to international organizations. This article integrates both perspectives by showing that individuals can also become socialized into trans-national norms by being embedded in international institutions (see the shaded area in Table 1). It views transgovernmental policy networks between the administrations of liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes as a site for the socialization of individuals into democratic norms.

Table 1. Approaches to International Socialization

	Socialization <i>through</i> international institutions	Socialization <i>in</i> international institutions
<i>Role</i> of international institutions in socialization	Actors/Promoters	Site
<i>Substance</i> of socialization in/through international institutions	Trans-national norms, e.g. democracy, human rights	International/European identity
<i>Target</i> of socialization in/through international socialization	Nation-states	Individuals

The efforts invested in theoretically and methodologically complex studies on international socialization result in only modest (if any) positive empirical findings (Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig 2003; Pollack 1998).¹ Why should we still expect democratic socialization to occur even in “hard cases” such as the mindset of state officials employed in Arab authoritarian regimes? First, attitude change toward democratic administrative governance does not imply changes of loyalty or identity touching upon the core of an individual’s personality. Instead, it refers to norms that belong to the professional realm of state officials. Second, democratic norms of governance as politically sensitive norms are not directly promoted but introduced through professional exchange within the framework of functional cooperation. Third, concentrating on attitude change allows for the capture of subliminal external influences since functional cooperation may shape the attitudes of domestic actors toward democratic governance but may not trigger behavioral realization in view of the likely repressive consequences. In this vein, this study complements existing research on socialization by examining subtle processes that have been neglected so far.

The theoretical argument proceeds as follows. Functional cooperation between the EU and its authoritarian neighbors is translated into action by transgovernmental policy networks. Policy networks are understood as ‘cluster[s] of actors, each of which has an interest, or “stake” in a given [...] policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure’ (Peterson and

¹ Exceptions are the positive findings of Gheciu (2005) and Flockhart’s (2004) study on the socialization into democratic norms and practices of national agents from Eastern candidate states. Even though the socialization promoted by NATO took place in the shadow of the perspective of membership, their findings point in a more optimistic direction.

Bomberg 1999: 8). Transgovernmental policy networks, in turn, are described as ‘pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the “domestic” from the “international” sphere’ (Slaughter 2004: 14). According to this view, transgovernmental means relaxing the assumption that a nation-state acts as an unitary actor. Instead, it suggests considering the emergence of networks that are initiated at an intermediate level between government and society and that operate among sub-units of governments ‘when they act relatively autonomously from higher authority in international politics’ (Keohane and Nye 1974: 41). These networks constitute a site of socialization; specialists from the administrations of EU Member States and neighboring countries are teamed together in order to generate and execute policy solutions based on EU legal and administrative standards. Given that the rules to be transferred were developed by established democracies, they envelop provisions of democratic governance (Freyburg *et al.* 2009). Moreover, it is assumed that European bureaucrats will apply and impart democratic governance when serving as experts abroad because of their professional socialization in democratic polities. Based on what they consider to be appropriate governance, they may address issues suppressed in national discourse, such as the participation of non-state actors in administrative decision making and the availability of information to the public. By participating in cooperative activities, their ENP counterparts can thus become acquainted with democratic practices of administrative governance unknown under authoritarian rule. All things considered, the EU’s approach of establishing functional cooperation with non-democratic non-member countries might be ‘capable of unleashing a dynamic of socialization around democratic norms’ (Youngs 2001: 360).

Socialization into Democratic Governance

Democratic socialization is defined as a process of attitude change toward democratic governance which emerges here as a consequence of exposure to the democratic rules and practices of administrative decision making.² It is, among others, present to the degree that individuals change their attitudes toward democratic norms as a consequence of experiences in policy networks which are not aimed at promoting democracy in the first place. The notion of democratic governance used here corresponds to the manifestation of democratic principles in administrative daily practices. It adopts the idea that democratic principles may be applicable to every situation in which collectively binding decisions are taken

² This definition largely corresponds to the classical understanding of socialization as a ‘process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel 2005: 804). For a discussion of alternative definitions, see Pollack (1998) and Johnston (2001: 494-5).

(Beetham 1999: 4-5; cf., Dahl 1971: 12). These principles can thus be translated into administrative rules and practices at the level of sub-units of state administration, even within a non-democratic polity. Unlike good governance (Kaufmann *et al.* 2005), democratic governance is not about how effectively and efficiently but how legitimately ‘the rules of the political game are managed’ (Hyden *et al.* 2004: 2; cf. Coston 1998). Governance-driven democratization increases the chances that those affected by collective decisions made at the administrative level will have some chance to influence those decisions.

For the purpose of assessing state officials’ attitudes toward democratic modes of decision making, a multidimensional concept of democratic governance is used. Democratic governance may vary in quality along three dimensions: transparency, accountability and participation (Freyburg *et al.* 2007; cf. Bovens 2007; Hyden *et al.* 2004; Brinkerhoff 2000). Transparency is about the provision of, and access to, various kinds of information for the general public (Zaharchenko and Goldenman 2004). Accountability at the administrative level refers to the obligation for officials to justify the use of resources and the achievement of outcomes toward citizens and independent third parties, and the establishment and application of procedures for administrative review, including the possibility of sanctions in the case of infringement (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29; Diamond *et al.* 1999: 3). Finally, participation largely corresponds to the key feature of the conventional understanding of democracy at the level of the nation-state (Dahl 1971; Verba 1967). Transferred to administrative governance, participation means that all willing members of the public should have an equal and effective opportunity to make their interests and concerns known, thereby shaping the outcome of the decisions. Although the margins between these dimensions are sometimes blurred, they are analyzed individually. This not only allows for the exploration of whether some dimensions of democratic governance are more open to socialization than others; functional cooperation also places emphasis on different dimensions of democratic governance in different sectors. Whereas the involvement of concerned citizens and interested non-state actors is, for instance, especially stressed in cooperation on environmental matters, the establishment of an independent control authority ensuring accountable governance is particularly emphasized in the field of competition.

Hypotheses to be Tested

The idea that policy-oriented cooperation between public administrations of liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes may trigger processes of democratic socialization is based on the assumption that social interaction and exchange among peers matters. Participation in transgovernmental networks is expected to positively shape attitudes toward democratic governance. In this sense, the overall hypothesis reads:

H1: State officials who have been involved in transgovernmental networks have a more positive attitude toward democratic governance than their non-participating colleagues (*cooperation*).

The corresponding null hypothesis is that participation in transgovernmental networks has no significant impact on attitudes toward democratic governance. First, scholars of political socialization usually consider socialization into fundamental political orientations as driven entirely by domestic conditions. Moreover, they argue that these orientations are developed early and remain fairly stable during their existence (Searing *et al.* 1976; Marsh 1971; Dawson and Prewitt 1969). Second, according to rational choice theorists, cooperation can change only the ranking of the actors' preferences but not the preferences and underlying identities and attitudes as such (Fearon and Wendt 2003: 62-5; Moravcsik 1993).

The democratizing potential of participation in transgovernmental networks might depend on other trans-national influences. Studies on the diffusion of democratic norms point to the distinguished role of exchange programs and foreign media in transferring democratic norms to non-democratic states. Whereas exchange programs allow citizens of non-democratic states to experience democratic decision making firsthand in a democratic country (Atkinson 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Nye 2004), foreign media broadcasts delineate democratic practices beyond borders (Kern and Hainmueller 2009; Way and Levitsky 2007; Wejnert 2005; Whitehead 1996). Consequently, state officials employed in a non-democratic polity have had experiences with democratic governance before they enter transgovernmental networks. Studies on international socialization identify this 'primacy effect' (Hooghe 2005: 866) as crucial for socialization to occur. State officials who have had prior experiences with democratic governance are expected to be more disposed to changing their attitudes toward this when they are re-exposed to democratic governance (Johnston 2001: 497; Checkel 2001: 563). Drawing on this reasoning, it is hypothesized that at least one of the conditions outlined needs to be satisfied before functional cooperation is sufficient to bring about its socializing effect.

Participation in transgovernmental networks is more likely to impact positively on the attitudes toward democratic governance of state officials who ...

H2a ... have stayed abroad for educational or professional reasons in a Western democratic country (*stay abroad*);

H2b ... regularly use Western media for political information (*foreign media*).

The two trans-national influences – foreign media and a stay abroad – are introduced in the analyses as both independent factors and interaction terms with participation in a trans-national network.

RESEARCH DESIGN: Measuring the Attitude toward Democratic Governance

This study applies a sequential mixed-method design complementing quantitative research with a qualitative study (Morse 2002) in order to explore the democratizing effect of functional cooperation. The first step is quantitative as multiple regression analyses are used to examine, in consecutive order, the association of explanatory variables relating to the properties of the state officials with each of the three dimensions of democratic governance and the overall concept. In other words, regression analyses are run separately for transparency, accountability and participation, and for democratic governance as such. The analyses are first conducted entering this study's key variable – participation in a Twinning project ('cooperation') – as a dichotomous variable measuring whether the individual state official was involved in a project or not. Subsequently, the analyses are repeated by using dummies for the individual projects. Because of its robustness to non-normality of continuous data, the analysis is done with a Maximum Likelihood parameter estimator (MLMV) that provides estimates with standard errors and mean- and variance-adjusted Chi-square test statistics (Brown 2006: 379; Muthén and Muthén 2006: 426).³ In a second step the individual Twinning projects are systematically compared in order to explore what properties of transgovernmental networks facilitate democratic socialization. Whereas multiple regression analyses for the individual Twinning projects enable us to detect differences in norm transfer between individual projects, subsequent qualitative comparison is used to explain these differences.

Sample Selection and Data Collection

EU functional cooperation in the neighborhood can take different shapes. Environmental cooperation in Morocco, for instance, used to be implemented by regional programs such as the Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Program (SMAP) in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the trans-national LIFE-third countries program established by the Sixth Action Program for the Environment, or multilateral platforms such as the Mediterranean component of the EU Water Initiative (EUWI). The ENP introduced new instruments of bilateral administrative interchange, notably the short-term Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Program (TAIEX),

³ The MLMV estimation is based on a MLM estimation that corresponds to Satorra-Bentler chi-square statistics.

providing targeted expert assistance, and the long-term Twinning program, a tool for cooperation on specific policy issues between sub-units of public administration.

The Twinning program is particularly suitable for an examination of the potential democratizing effect of functional cooperation (European Court of Auditors 2003; Cooper and Johansen 2003: 6-7; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2003: 631). First, Twinning projects are an administrative reality as they are part of governance within the administration. They aim at modernizing the departments that benefit through training and reorganization as well as by drafting laws and regulations modeled on the EU *acquis*. The policy solutions offered thus incorporate elements of democratic governance. Second, in contrast to alternative policy reform programs, Twinning projects are based on intensive working relations on a day-to-day basis for a considerable period of time. This not only helps to build relationships based on trust and mutual understanding, but also familiarizes state officials with democratic administrative practices. Third, all projects follow the same tight and formalized structure, which makes them comparable. At the same time, they are issue-specific and show significant differences with regard to properties such as the number of departments to benefit and the degree of politicization of the policy issues concerned. Since there is no more than one project in any single sub-unit of public administration, the effects of these properties can be isolated; the effect of alternative cooperation programs is controlled. Finally, possible interfering effects of selective recruitment (Hooghe 2005; Pollack 1998; Kerr 1973) can be assumed to be marginal. In most cases, every state official working in a department that benefits was involved in at least one of the various activities.⁴ The appointment as a participant in the individual activities of a Twinning project is decided on the basis of objective criteria, such as the field of responsibility in the department and professional performance rather than on personal contacts and loyalty.⁵ In the rare event of non-participation of individual state officials, absence was primarily due to the fact that there was (hitherto) no activity in the respective field of responsibility or that the official could not make it to the session.


⁴ Consequently, only a few officials were able to experience an indirect socialization effect of functional cooperation due to exchange with immediate colleagues involved in a Twinning project.

⁵ The survey among state officials covers the question 'How important do you think the following factors were for your own appointment as a participant in the Twinning project?' The following possible categories for a response are: 'international experience', 'language skills', 'education', 'previous work with the person in charge', 'personality', 'professional performance', 'personal contacts', 'field of responsibility in department', measured on a 5-point Likert agreement scale. The same question is included in a survey among the European bureaucrats that served as Twinning experts in Morocco. Responses are complemented by interviews with Twinning participants and project leaders/experts. Descriptive statistics can be obtained from the author.

The effect of participation in Twinning activities on the attitude toward democratic governance is examined by taking the example of Morocco. Morocco belongs to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which consists of authoritarian regimes that – until recently – experienced no noteworthy, genuinely endogenous democratization processes. Figure 1 displays the values Freedom House provides for each Arab country in the period of 2000 to 2008. The figure clearly demonstrates that even Morocco and Jordan, which are widely referred to as the most politically liberalized countries in the Arab world, still belong to the group of authoritarian regimes. Jordan and Morocco are the only countries that Freedom House has consistently ranked as “partly free”. For 2000-08 their combined ratings of political rights and civil liberties are 4.7 on average. A minimum degree of openness can thus be expected (Al-Arkoubi and McCourt 2004: 983; Mohamedou 1999: 211), which enhances the likelihood that administrative cooperation will induce democratic socialization.

Furthermore, as a bureaucratic monarchy Morocco’s political system is characterized by traditional paternalistic structures that attach great importance to state bureaucracy for the maintenance and stability of the regime (Pawelka 2002; Zerhouni 2004). Moreover, Morocco was among the first Southern neighboring countries to sign the ENP Action Plan and to initiate Twinning projects. Today it enjoys a privileged status (*statut avancé*) within the ENP. If participation in transgovernmental networks impacts on the attitudes of state officials in neighboring authoritarian regimes, then we should be able to detect such an effect in the case of EU Twinning programs in Morocco. In turn, in the case of a negative finding it is acceptable to conclude that if less institutionalized and located in countries politically less liberalized, administrative cooperation will show no significant effect.

Figure 1. Political Rights and Civil Liberties in the Arab World, 2000-2008



Descriptive statistics. *Freedom House* classifies countries whose combined average value of political rights and civil liberties falls between 3.0 and 5.5 as “partly free” and between 5.5 and 7.0 as “not free”. The average value for Algeria constantly lies at 5.5; the line is overlapped by the lines for Lebanon (2000-04) and Egypt (2004-08).

To measure the attitudes toward democratic governance of Moroccan state officials a closed-end questionnaire was constructed entitled *Administrative Rules and Practices in Public Administration in Morocco*. The respondents were selected by a theoretically controlled cluster sampling: all officials working in particular departments of certain ministries were invited to fill in the questionnaire. Personal distribution, on site, of the questionnaire to the state officials enabled a response rate of approximately 96 per cent.⁶ An almost full

⁶ Thanks to the opportunity given to leave inconvenient questions blank, to guaranteed anonymity and to the persuasive approach taken, outright refusal was almost absent. Only one official flatly refused to fill in the questionnaire; fewer than five officials could not be reached because of professional commitments abroad or holidays. It is difficult to test sample bias conclusively because socio-demographic data on state officials in Morocco are not available. Respondents

survey of the selected departments was important in order to ensure that it was not only specific, for instance pro-European-minded officials, that filled in the questionnaire. Two groups of officials are equally covered: officials that participated in a Twinning project ($N = 85$) and officials that are employed in a thematically related department in a ministry not targeted by a Twinning project ($N = 65$).⁷ The difference in attitude between these two groups is ascribed to the effects of participation, while including explicit controls for the relevant properties of the state officials (quasi-experimental ‘static group comparison’, Campbell and Stanley 1966: 12). The ‘fundamental problem of causal inference’ (Holland 1986) is that for each respondent we never get to observe both potential outcomes but only the realized ones. In other words, for a respondent participating in an EU Twinning project, we never get to observe the counterfactual level of attitude toward democratic governance that she would have had if she had not participated in the project (and *vice versa*). To obtain an unbiased treatment it is therefore crucial to find a suitable control group that is sufficiently similar to the group under examination in all relevant characteristics except that it was not exposed to Twinning activities.

The Dependent Variables

Since this study could not build on existing surveys, it required the creation of suitable democratic governance items in order to measure the dependent variables, in other words the attitudes of state officials toward democratic governance. The three theoretically derived dimensions of democratic governance – transparency, accountability and participation – are operationalized with issue indicators pertaining to various aspects of administrative decision making. Conceptual work on public administration (reform), and the linking of (good) governance and development, inspired their formulation (Hyden *et al.* 2004; Baker 2002; Page 1985; Berger 1957). All items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale on agreement responses. To minimize the risk of response tendencies, the statement items were randomly distributed in two out of 36 different sets of questions⁸, some of the items appear reformulated in different statements, and

could choose the language of communication (French or Arabic)); 9 per cent picked the Arabic version.

⁷ Due to this specific and limited nature of the target group, the questionnaire was cognitively pre-tested by knowledgeable experts (Collins 2003; Presser *et al.* 2004) – psychologists and political scientists specializing in Arab authoritarian regimes – and colleagues with Arab backgrounds.

⁸ The two sets of questions are introduced as follows: ‘There are different understandings of what determines the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in public administration. To what extent do you personally agree that the following items serve this function?’ (item 7+8) / ‘There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a ‘good’ civil servant. To what extent to you personally agree or disagree that a civil servant should have the following qualities?’ (item 1-6).

some capture statements on features of non-democratic governance (negatively-oriented items).

Despite the precautions taken in questionnaire design and survey setting, the existence of preference falsification cannot be completely ruled out. Yet, I am not primarily interested in identifying the true understanding of appropriate governance among Arab state officials. Instead, I am concerned with estimating the difference in agreement with democratic governance between state officials who participated in transgovernmental networks and those who did not. It can essentially be assumed that there is no systematic bias of response tendencies; a socialization effect can therefore not be ascribed to the effect of response tendencies.

Table 2. Three Dimensions of Attitude toward Democratic Governance

<i>Participation</i>	
1	‘A civil servant should take into account the views and concerns of affected citizens before making decisions’
2	‘A civil servant should offer updated information on governmental policy’
3	‘A civil servant should ensure that the citizens’ views and concerns have an influence on shaping policies’
n	‘A civil servant should always seek to bring the public into accordance with governmental policy’
<i>Transparency</i>	
4	‘A civil servant should work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public’
5	‘A civil servant should provide citizens with the possibility of advancing their views as an input for governmental decision making’
6	‘A civil servant should make information available to anyone requesting it’
n	‘A civil servant should assure that all information held by public authority remains in the hands of the government only’
<i>Accountability</i>	
7	‘Monitoring by independent state institutions ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’
8	‘Possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny of the decision-making process and review of policies ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’
n	‘Instructions of and approval by the higher authority ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’

n = negatively-oriented item.

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) helped to identify the items that are most suitable for measuring attitude toward democratic governance in its three dimensions.⁹ Table 2 displays the exact wording of the items. It is run only on the positively-oriented items. Due to a non-response rate of about ten per cent to the three negatively-oriented items, their number of missing values is comparatively high. Their incorporation would have disproportionately decreased the number of cases and thus led to a substantial loss of information on the regular items. Based on the theoretical idea that a true democrat is one who supports items of regular democratic governance and rejects their logical opposites, the dependent variables are assessed using scales that aggregate the positively-oriented items and the negatively-oriented item. The items used for each scale are the positively-oriented items with a factor loading of .40 or more in the factor analysis (Worthington and Whittaker 2006: 823) and the theoretically corresponding negatively-oriented item. Scales were constructed by adding values of individual item values and dividing the sum by the number of items for each dimension. The overall concept of democratic governance is measured by the mean of the three individual scales.¹⁰


The distribution of the outcome variables is shown in Figure 2 (for descriptive statistics see Annex Ia). The boxes show the middle values of the dependent variables (50 per cent of the data) with the black line indicating the median value, while the ends of the vertical lines ('whiskers') stretch to the greatest and lowest value of these variables. The dashed line represents the mean

⁹ The exploratory factor analysis is done using the robust mean and variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) extraction procedure and the oblique rotation method, Oblimin. The exact factor loadings are provided in Annex II.

¹⁰ EFA enables to determine items that are suitable to create scales with high internal consistency, as corroborated by each scale's internal reliability. The point estimate for the scale reliability (ρ) of participation is .79 (three items), of accountability .58 (two items) and of transparency .75 (three items), if Raykov's confirmatory FA-based method is applied. This approach is not only insensitive to the violation of the assumption of normality but also presents a more accurate estimate of the reliability of multi-items measures than the usual Cronbach's alpha (though the value of the expressions is identical) (Sijtsma 2009; Raykov 2007; Brown 2006: 337-45). Cronbach's α of participation is .68, of accountability .38 and of transparency .46. Given the exploratory character of this study, its objective (attitudes and preferences) and the small number of items per scale, the reliability of the individual scales is still acceptable if the theoretically corresponding negatively-oriented item is added to each scale (cf. John and Benet-Martínez 2000: 346). Since these items could not be introduced in the EFA, Cronbach's alpha has to be used instead of the more reliable approach of Raykov. Cronbach's alpha is .61 for participation, .14 for accountability and .30 for transparency. The lower values reflect the advice not to combine regularly-worded and reverse-scored items in one single scale since doing so might impair reliability of measurement and thus absorb the desired reduction of response biases (cf. Schriesheim *et al.* 1991; Pilotte and Gable 1990). I cross-checked the validity of this study's results by running the regression analyses on separate scales for the positively- and negatively-oriented items; the estimation results are similar and can be obtained from the author.

value of democratic governance as overall category (right box). Since a few outliers are present, as indicated by the points, the whiskers extend to a maximum of 1.5 times the inter-quartile range.

Figure 2. Attitude toward Democratic Governance



Box plot. Values range between 1 (non-democratic) to 5 (democratic); $N = 110$, cases with missing values excluded listwise.

Variables Introduced in the Regression Analyses ('Properties of the actors to be socialized')

The key independent variable of my analysis is participation in a Twinning project ('cooperation'). It is coded as a binary variable with a value of 1 if an official participates/d in a Twinning project. The model is completed by introducing two alternative explanatory factors and two control variables that characterize the individual state official.

As alternative explanatory factors I enter two variables – a 'stay abroad' in a Western democracy and the use of 'foreign media' e – that have attracted increased attention in their capacity to transfer democratic norms into non-democratic states. They are both introduced as independent and modifying variables to cooperation.¹¹ The use of foreign media applies to Western print

¹¹ The regression analysis is re-run for alternative codings, e.g. separate categories for television and print media without statistically significant differences. The least complex solution is applied.

media (newspaper and magazines) and television channels that are used for political information (rather than as a source of entertainment).¹² Respondents were asked to indicate which newspaper/magazines and television channels they read and watch for political information, in which languages, and how often they do so. Since media products originate predominantly in Europe – about 97 per cent of foreign print media and 94 per cent of foreign TV channels used – the expected influence of this link through communication can be said to be European. Media penetration is treated as dichotomous with ‘1’ representing regular media usage. ‘Stay abroad’ refers to the international experience of officials, operationalized as a stay abroad for at least six months for educational or professional reasons in the ‘old’ Member States of the European Union and/or North America (NA). This variable is coded as a binary variable with ‘1’ for residence in the EU and/or in the United States/Canada. There are no significant differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials who spent a considerable period of time in Europe and those who had been in North America or in both host destinations.¹³ Since the number of visitors to North America is very small (N = 9 only NA, N = 6 NA and EU), Europe and North America are subsumed into one category. Officials who spent a considerable time in ‘the West’ do not substantially consult Western media more often. The two variables are not significantly interrelated (see correlation matrix in Annex Ib).

In addition to the three independent variables, two control variables are included in the model: administrative pre-socialization and participation in previous programs. Officials that entered the public administration after reform-oriented forces had taken over the government, and/or that had gained knowledge of democratic governance through participation in previous policy reform programs set up and implemented by Western donors, are more likely to demonstrate a more positive attitude toward democratic governance. This proposition accounts for pre-socialization (cf., Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005: 813; Johnston 2005; Hooghe 2005). Senior officials in particular – as “well-connected” members of the old guard’ (Baker 2002: 293) – might perceive democratic governance as a real threat to their privileges. Moreover, officials who are newly employed in the respective administrative sub-unit are less embedded in the prevailing culture of governance, and thus more likely to conform to

Regression results are available upon request. Annex Ib displays descriptive statistics and intercorrelation of independent variables.

¹² A recent study on public support for the East German communist regime revealed that if foreign media is used primarily as a source of entertainment it may even increase support for the regime (Kern and Hainmueller 2009).

¹³ A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the mean ranks for the three dimensions does not display any significant differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials that spent time in Europe or in North America (df = 2; $\chi^2 = .310$, p = .856 for participation; $\chi^2 = 1.913$, p = .384 for accountability; $\chi^2 = .208$, p = .901 for transparency).

democratic modes (Checkel 2001: 562; Johnston 2001: 497; Flockhart 2004). Administrative socialization is operationalized by the years of professional service under the 'new' King Mohammed VI, that is more years of service under the present than under the previous regime (0), or more years of service under the previous regime ruled by King Hassan II (1). The reason for this coding is that the political regime during the long reign (1961-99) of King Hassan II was characterized by 'control over both the technocratic state apparatus and the army and the police' (Desrues and Moyano 2001: 21). With the ascension of Mohammed VI in 1999 a new spirit of political, social, and economic reform entered the country while, at the same time, the real potential for meaningful democratic change remained limited (Zerhouni 2004). Participation in previous policy reform programs is entered as a binary variable with value of 1 if the official participated in at least one program. 46 per cent of the respondents had participated in a program set up by development agencies of EU Member States, most notably the French Development Agency (AFD) and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ); 36 per cent attended activities organized by the World Bank; 23.2 percent by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); 20 per cent by the Japan International Development Agency (JICA); and 18.5 per cent participated in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Earlier participation in policy reform programs other than the EU Twinning program constitutes a factor independent from 'cooperation' (see correlation matrix in Annex Ib). Again, variables are entered as constitutive and interaction terms.

Features Used in Comparative Analysis ('Properties of the policy networks as sites of socialization')

It is expected that not only the properties of individual state officials but also the properties of the individual transgovernmental networks determine the likelihood of socialization into democratic governance. If few departments to benefit are involved ('size'), external experts stay for a long period of time ('duration'), and interaction occurs in 'less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings' (Checkel 2003: 213), interaction among the participants is more intense and trustworthy (Slaughter 2004: 198-200; Checkel 2003: 210; van Waarden 1992; Marsden 1990) which, in turn, is expected to make attitude change toward democratic governance more likely. These three properties are used to explain differences in effect between the individual Twinning projects in Morocco.

The three variables are operationalized using indirect measures at the level of networks rather than identifying values for each individual state official. The size of the network is operationalized as the number of departments to benefit and the ministries involved. Duration refers to the length of the Twinning project in months at the time of the survey. Values for network size and duration are

attributed by labeling the highest number of involved units and the longest period, respectively, as 'high' and, correspondingly, the smallest network and the shortest interaction as 'low'. Networks that fall in between these two categories are classified as 'medium'. Finally, politicization is about the importance of the policy issues for the integrity of the state and maintenance of political power by the ruling elite. Although transgovernmental policy networks generally operate without much publicity and are relatively unaffected by the turbulence of political disputes (Pollack 2005: 906; Slaughter 2000: 200-2), functional cooperation is still embedded in politics and affected by political interests and power. Interviews with Moroccan state officials, journalists and non-governmental activists, as well as representatives of international organizations, EU Member States and the Delegation of the European Commission, helped to classify the policy issues under study as high, medium or low. Indicators are, for example, that media coverage is more pluralized and sectoral cooperation is less impeded by political considerations. Touching upon internally sensitive issues such as corruption, patronage and the mixing of private business with governmental responsibilities, and competition policy, for instance, can be regarded as politicized.

EMPIRICS: EU Functional Cooperation and Democratic Socialization in Morocco

In order to estimate the effect of participation in a Twinning project on the attitudes of participating state officials, I calculated four models. In model 1 the dependent variables that are the three individual dimensions of democratic governance and the overall concept are each regressed on the Twinning variable; Model 2 controls in addition for the four explanatory variables that refer to the properties of the state officials. In Models 1 and 2 (Hypothesis 1) the interaction terms are omitted. In order to test the conditional effects (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), I introduce cross-product terms of the Twinning variable and each of the explanatory factors as dummies (Brambor *et al.* 2006; Braumoeller 2004). Table 3 displays those interaction effects that are significant (Model 3). In the control model, the state officials' properties are regressed alone on the democratic governance variables (Model 4).

The Democratizing Effect of EU Functional Cooperation across all Sectors

Table 3 presents the estimation results for the likelihood of an EU Twinning project in shaping the participants' attitude toward democratic governance. The results support the democratizing potential of functional cooperation. They reveal, however, that participation in a Twinning project alone does not significantly shape the attitudes of the state officials involved (Model 1). The coefficient of

cooperation is positive but not significant.¹⁴ Hypothesis 1 on the independent effect of functional cooperation is to be declined. Interestingly, participation in policy reform programs in general has a significant independent effect on attitude toward democratic governance. The coefficient of ‘previous programs’ in model 2 is positive and significant. However, the positive correlation is not necessarily the result of attendance but may be that of an accumulation of these programs in less politicized fields. 58.4 percent of the projects of the three most important external actors of the Western-democratic hemisphere next to the EU and its Member States – the United States of America (USAID), the World Bank and Japan – in which the responding officials participated, took place in policy fields such as the environment, health and education (United States Agency for International Development 2011; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2011).

Table 3. Results of the Regressions – Democratic Governance

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
Cooperation	.084 (.074)	.068 (.075)	-.092 (.095)	.272 (.114)*	
Admin.		-.036 (.073)	-.042 (.072)	-.042 (.072)	-.045 (.074)
Socialization					
Stay abroad		-.052 (.075)	-.251 (.119)*	.251 (.119)*	-.049 (.075)
Foreign media		-.085 (.092)	-.055 (.090)	-.055 (.090)	-.062 (.089)
Previous programs		.217 (.077)**	.218 (.074)**	.218 (.074)**	.221 (.077)**
Coop x 1: stay abroad			.364 (.148)*		
Coop x 1: no stay abroad				-.364 (.148)*	
R^2	.012	.096	.152	.152	.089
AIC	236.286	764.886	762.090	762.090	623.859
Log Likelihood	-128.643	-375.443	-373.045	-373.045	-305.929
N	110	103	103	103	103

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$.*

¹⁴ This finding supports the observation that participation in a Twinning project is not based on the specific properties of the individual officials such as a particularly positive or negative attitude toward the EU or democratic principles and as such a possible confounding effect for democratic socialization in Twinning projects.

In contrast to common wisdom that usage of Western media and international education have a democratizing effect, my findings show that state officials who have been exposed to these transnational influences are not more open-minded about democratic governance. Rather, in both cases the coefficient is even (though not significantly) negative (Model 2). While I do not find a significant conditional effect of participation in Twinning activities in relation to foreign media usage, the coefficient of the interaction term of cooperation and stay abroad in Model 3a is positive and statistically significant, as confirmed by a Wald test ($p=.000$; $df=3$; $\chi^2=4793.418$). This finding supports Hypothesis 2a but not Hypothesis 2b. It seems that the activities of Twinning programs can only significantly influence state officials' understanding of appropriate governance, if the officials have already had personal experiences with democratic procedures in Western democracies previous to their participation in these activities. If state officials had been abroad during their studies, that is before they entered state administration, the marginal effect of participation in a Twinning project on the attitude of state officials with international experiences is positive (as demonstrated by the coefficients in Model 3: $-.092+.364=.272$; cf. Brambor *et al.* 2006: 73). With regard to the effect of transgovernmental networks on the attitude toward democratic governance of state officials – and this effect is within the focus of the present article – this finding predominantly means that previous contact with democratic principles, independently of their evaluation, seems to be necessary so that subsequent targeted exchange can refer to already existing schemata, and can activate and interpret these cognitive structures.

The results of the regression on the individual dimensions mirror the findings of the regression on democratic governance overall (see Annex III). Whereas regression on participatory governance yields a similar pattern of significant regression coefficients, the results on accountable and transparent governance differ in that the Twinning program produces neither an independent nor a conditioning effect.

The Democratizing Effect of the Individual Twinning Projects

At the time of this study Morocco benefits from nine Twinning projects that run for at least one year.¹⁵ Out of these projects, four Twinning projects were selected for the empirical analysis: the Twinning project 'Coordinated Management of the Environment and the Harmonization of National Environmental Legislation' (MA04/AA/EN03); the project 'Development and Implementation of the Legislative, Organizational and Technological Means of Ensuring Free Commercial Trade at Borders' (MA04/AA/FI01); the project 'Support for the Strengthening of the Competition Authorities' (MA06/AA/FI08); and the project

¹⁵ A list of the Moroccan projects is available upon request.

‘Reinforcement of the Health Control Organizations – Veterinary and Phytosanitary’ (MA06/AA/HE06). These four Twinning projects differ with regard to the properties identified, notably their size, duration and the degree of politicization of the policy field.

The Twinning project on the environment shows the most favorable conditions: a low degree of politicization and a medium-sized network. The project ‘Development and Implementation of the Legislative, Organizational and Technological Means of Ensuring Free Commercial Trade at Borders’ – the Moroccan Customs and Indirect Taxes Administration being the main department to benefit – faces a high degree of politicization and a large number of departments involved in benefiting from it. Between the range of these two projects are the project on competition matters and the project on health control. An overview of these properties is given in Table 4. The policy fields of competition and customs can be treated as highly politicized, because they touch upon internally sensitive issues such as corruption, patronage and the mixing of private business with governmental responsibilities. In policy fields providing public goods, such as the environment and, albeit to a lesser extent, health control, media coverage is more pluralized and transgovernmental cooperation is less impeded by political considerations, which are indicators for a lower degree of politicization.

Regression analyses for the individual projects shed light on the democratizing potential of the Twinning program. Albeit these analyses overall show the same effect of participation in a Twinning project on the condition of a stay abroad as the general regression analyses above, they also make it possible to reveal the differences between the individual projects (see Annex III). Whereas the project on the environment has a significant, independent effect on the attitudes toward democratic governance of the officials involved, the projects on competition and health control influence these attitudes only significantly if the officials involved have stayed abroad prior to their participation in the project. The customs project, however, yields neither a significant independent nor conditional effect.

The analysis produces two additional results. First, the effect of participation in a Twinning project is sector-related. The attitudes toward the sub-dimensions of democratic governance are most significantly influenced toward the sub-dimension that is most relevant in the particular sub-sector. Second, participation in Twinning activities can yield a significant negative effect in some policy fields if the state officials use foreign media products for political information (Hypothesis 2b).

Interestingly, Twinning projects shape the participants’ attitudes toward the dimension of democratic governance that corresponds best to the projects’ sector-specific objectives. The competition project significantly influences

attitudes toward accountable governance. This reflects the project's objective, which is the establishment of judicial and administrative procedures to ensure a competition control system comparable with that of EU Member States. To this end, the project places particular emphasis on the activation and strengthening of the Competition Council so that it emerges into an independent control authority. It further seeks to 'ensure the right of appeal to independent courts against anti-trust decisions' (European Commission 2004: 23) and a judicial system with competent tribunals to judge the decisions adopted by the competition authorities. The Twinning project on health control of food for consumers emphasizes participation in particular. It aims to strengthen consumer protection by enhancing the involvement of consumer associations and producers in the decision making on, and implementation of, product quality policy. This project is successful in significantly shaping attitudes toward participatory governance. The Twinning project on the environment attaches particular importance to the establishment of 'procedures concerning access to information and public participation' (European Commission 2004: 36) and even seeks to introduce a Law on Access to Environmental Information. It most significantly influences state officials' attitudes toward transparent and participatory governance.

The effects described in the sector are not independent effects but require prior familiarization with democratic governance through a stay abroad in Western democracies. Apparently, neither personal practical experience in Western democracies abroad nor attendance of Twinning activities is sufficient in order to socialize state officials into democratic governance. It seems as if both the 'life' experience of democratic administrative governance as practiced in Western democracies and knowledge imparted in policy reform workshops are necessary in order to significantly shape attitudes. An exception is the environmental project as it yields a significant independent effect on the state officials' attitudes toward participatory governance. In contrast, the Twinning project on customs duty produces no significant democratizing effect, although particular importance is attached to accountable governance, especially in terms of internal audit and ensuring the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in the Customs and Indirect Taxes Administration.

To what extent can network properties shed light on the differences in the democratizing potential of the individual projects? Table 4 summarizes the comparative analysis. It appears that the development of trust among the participants is crucial for a network to shape the attitudes of its participants.¹⁶ Trust is important in order to make open exchange possible which allows for the discussion of sensitive questions such as access to information for journalists. It becomes evident that democratic socialization is facilitated if interaction takes

¹⁶ There exists a quite comprehensive literature on trust in professional networks, see for instance Fox (1974: 362); Kramer (1999); and Rhodes (2006: 18).

place in a less politicized environment such as the environment. In politicized fields such as competition policy, in turn, it appears as if participants are socialized into democratic principles and practices if interaction is particularly dense.

Table 4. Comparison of Network Properties

	Customs duty	Competition	Health control	Environment
<i>Regression results for individual Twinning projects (cf. Tables IV in Annex)</i>				
Effect (dimension)	No significant effect	Significant conditional effect (accountability)	Significant conditional effect (participation)	Significant conditional effect (transparency). Significant independent effect (participation)
<i>Properties of the individual Twinning projects</i>				
Size	Large (2 ministries, 4 departments)	Small (1 ministry, 1 department)	Medium (1 ministry, 2 departments plus provincial departments)	Medium (1 ministry, 5 departments)
Duration	Long (18 months)	Short (9 months)	Medium (13 months)	Long (19 months)
Politicization	High	High	Medium	Low

Whereas the Twinning project on customs duty (a high degree of politicization) yields no significant democratizing effect at all, the environment project (a low degree of politicization) is significantly influential in shaping attitudes toward democratic governance. Interviews on site with participants and my own observations confirm that in less politicized fields the participants enjoy more room for maneuver and are less suspicious toward external actors. If the interaction setting is, however, politicized, a small number of participants still seems to ensure intense and trustworthy interaction and thus to enable democratic socialization. The Twinning project on competition is apparently likewise successful in socializing participants into democratic governance despite a high degree of politicization. The reports of participants demonstrate that they got to

know one another as individuals and gained mutual confidence in each other. The duration of the network, that is the length of the contact, appears to have no considerable influence on its ability to shape the participants' democratic mindset. Whereas participation in the Twinning project on customs duty generates no significant influence despite its long duration, the short duration of the Twinning project on competition was sufficient to shape the participating state officials' attitudes toward democratic governance, if they had previously stayed in a foreign democratic country.

The regression analysis further reveals the possibility that participation in Twinning activities can generate a significant negative effect if state officials use foreign media products for political information.¹⁷ However, this is only the case for state officials who participated in the project on competition and on health control, respectively. State officials that benefitted from the project on environmental matters, in contrast, are positively influenced if they use foreign media (see Annex IV). Moreover, foreign media penetration is influential on a state official's attitude toward the concept of democratic governance if she worked on competition or on environment. If she is employed in the field of health control, it only shapes the attitude toward the transparency component of democratic governance.

A glance at Table 4 points to the possible explanation that the degree of politicization determines how information on democratic governance provided by foreign media is perceived. It appears that democratic modes of governance are not perceived as a threat to the regime's authority in non-politicized fields which provide public goods, such as the environment. Rather, state officials might understand how important democratic governance is for the well-being of the population. In politically sensitive fields, however, democratic governance is likely to be perceived as extremely disturbing by officials serving in authoritarian regimes. This might also explain why foreign media broadcasts increase the aversion of state officials employed in the field of health control to transparent governance. They could be alienated by how far-reaching transparency can be when even internal governmental material is made available to the public and what consequences this would have if applied at home. These interpretations are, however, only tentative and warrant further study.

Conclusion

This article has explored the democratizing potential of functional cooperation between the administrations of both established democracies and authoritarian regimes. More precisely, it has sought to detect whether the ENP Twinning

¹⁷ Again, neither the use of foreign media nor participation in Twinning activities alone yields such an effect.

projects as a form of functional cooperation positively shape attitudes toward democratic governance of the state officials involved, as a consequence of joint problem-solving and social interaction. The results are of relevance for policymaking and academic research alike; they not only provide room for a more optimistic view of the effects of functional cooperation as yielding subtle processes of democratization but also challenge the hitherto predominantly negative findings of the effects of socialization in and through international institutions.

In terms of theory, the present article is relevant for predominantly two strands of literature: research on processes of socialization and research on the diffusion of transnational norms. The article speaks to research on socialization in that it explores processes of international socialization in a context in which a confounding effect of national socialization can largely be excluded or the effect of national socialization should counterbalance the effect of transnational socialization, respectively. Since an effect of functional cooperation on the attitudes of state officials toward democratic governance could be demonstrated by the present study, the question arises whether subtle processes of changes in attitude toward transnational norms could not also happen in alternative contexts, including those already explored such as the European Commission and UN assemblies – and whether research into socialization is far from being an ‘exhausted’ research program (Pollack 1998; Schimmelfennig 2003). Second, the present article enriches existing research on the diffusion of transnational norms. It not only introduces, with transgovernmental networks, a hitherto neglected transmitter of transnational norms as an empirical subject for research, but also explores explicitly the micro foundation of the argument for diffusion. The negative results on socialization in democratic principles through foreign media and stays abroad cast doubt on current knowledge about the diffusion of norms through transnational exchange.

Three main findings concerning the democratizing potential of functional cooperation in Morocco have emerged from the study presented here. First, functional cooperation can, under the condition of a prior stay abroad, socialize state officials into democratic governance. It thus holds the promising potential of planting the seeds for change inside authoritarian regimes as it significantly shapes the participants’ attitudes toward democratic modes of decision making. Whether and under what conditions the planted seeds, that is a positive attitude toward democratic governance, will grow in daily administrative practices warrants further study. It also remains to be seen whether such democratic administrative governance will ultimately spill over into the general polity by unfolding dynamics that promote democratization rather than stabilization of the entire political system. In view of the recent political upheavals in the Arab world, it would be interesting to explore to what extent the changed political

environment in initially less liberalized states such as Tunisia and Egypt facilitates similar processes there. In Egypt institutional capacity building belongs to the priorities of the European Neighborhood Policy. The European Union specifies 14 Twinning projects between 2004 and 2010 in fields such as transport, tourism, and the environment that are either already closed or still running (European Union 2009). Moreover, Egypt is one of the first Southern Mediterranean countries that participates in the program ‘Support for Improvement in Governance and Management’ (SIGMA), launched by the EU in 2008 and jointly implemented with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This program centers on the reform of administrative decision-making processes. The news that state officials were participating in the protests in early 2011 in Egypt and partly quitting their jobs support such optimistic readings of this study’s results.

The findings, however, also reveal that democratic socialization through cooperation in the sector is most significant in those dimensions of democratic governance that are most relevant in that specific sector. This finding strengthens the functional argument of democratic socialization as a side effect of technical problem-solution patterns. In particular the analysis of the Twinning project on the environment demonstrates that explicit reference to democratic elements in joint policy development is very successful in transferring democratic norms. It would be interesting to see to what extent this finding can be generalized to policy reform programs other than the EU Twinning project. Importantly, however, when used as a direct strategy for the promotion of democracy, functional cooperation risks losing its political innocence and, thus, its potential to initiate subtle processes of democratization. Nevertheless it seems as if the European Commission will continue to develop its neighborhood policy in this direction. Inter-administrative cooperation has recently been presented as pivotal to the new strategy toward the Southern Mediterranean countries by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, , in an article published in *The International Herald Tribune* on 26 February 2011. What she describes as ‘detailed, unglamorous, work on the ground’ (Ashton 2011) – in cooperation with civil servants, local communities, the police, army and judiciary – is also a core part of the EU Commission’s March 2011 communication on a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. It explicitly refers to inter-administrative cooperation programs such as Twinning projects to support the ‘consolidation of change’ (European Commission 2011: 5/6). Twinning projects are transgovernmental networks that implement functional cooperation at the level of state administration.

A third finding suggests that a low degree of politicization of the policy issues facilitates democratic socialization and that a high degree of politicization

can be counterbalanced by intense cooperation among a small number of participants. The finding on the importance of the degree of politicization for democratic socialization in transgovernmental networks points to the limits of functional cooperation as a strategy for the promotion of democracy. It seems as if functional cooperation needs to take place in a setting that allows for open exchange about democratic principles and practises of decision making. However, the extent to which the quality of social interaction increases the likelihood of democratic socialization needs to be explored more rigorously. Further studies are required in order to make a statement relating to what extent not only the quality of social interaction but also the general degree of political liberalization increases or decreases, respectively, the likelihood of socialization in democratic governance through functional cooperation.

This study presents an analysis of the democratizing potential of functional cooperation. In so doing, it takes a novel perspective that acknowledges the possible side effects of a cooperation that is demanded by the authoritarian elites, and enjoys the scope for intense exchange between Western democracies and authoritarian regimes. Socialization into democratic governance through functional cooperation deserves further exploration – in particular in view of the fact that all instruments and strategies adopted by external actors to directly promote democracy (apart from intervention by force) are condemned to fail toward stable authoritarian regimes where the incumbent rulers show little inclination to concede their power.

ANNEX

Ia. Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variable

	Participation	Transparency	Accountability	Democratic Governance
Max. value	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Min. value	2.50	2.25	2.00	2.83
Mean	4.30	4.04	3.84	4.06
Median	4.50	4.00	4.00	4.11
S.D.	.578	.427	.672	.382
Skewness	-.751	-.547	-.635	-.570

Descriptive statistics. *Values range between 1 (non-democratic) to 5 (democratic); N = 110, cases with missing values excluded listwise; S.D. = standard deviation.*

Ib. Descriptive Statistics – Independent Variables

	Cooperation	Admin. Socialization	Stay abroad	Foreign Media	Previous Programs
Mean	.56	.61	.42	.79	.53
Median	1	1	0	1	1
Frequencies ‘0’	44.4	61.5	57.8	207.	46.7
‘1’	55.6	38.5	42.2	79.3	53.3
Standard deviation	.407	.488	.496	.407	.501
(1) Cooperation	1.00				
(2) Admin. socialization	-.018	1.00			
(3) Stay abroad	.051	.170*	1.00		
(4) Foreign media	.201**	.194*	.071	1.00	
(5) Previous programs	.080	.158*	.158*	.198**	1.00

Descriptive Statistics. *Frequencies in percentage; N = 135, cases with missing values excluded listwise. One tailed p-value of non-parametric Spearman-Rho coefficients; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01.*

II. Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis

Indicators/items		Factors/dimensions						<i>h</i> ²
		Participation		Transparency		Accountability		
		Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	
1	'A civil servant should take into account the views and concerns of affected citizens before making decisions'	.981***	.104	-.050	.035	-.063*	.027	.873
2	'A civil servant should offer updated information on governmental policy'	.433**	.168	.051	.127	.250	.178	.386
3	'A civil servant should ensure that the citizens' views and concerns have an influence on shaping policies'	.644**	.226	.126	.155	.128	.215	.585
4	'A civil servant should work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public'	.119	.198	.568**	.186	.242	.217	.476
5	'A civil servant should provide citizens with the possibility of advancing their views as an input for governmental decision making'	.299	.196	.459**	.147	.261	.179	.542
6	'A civil servant should make information available to anyone requesting it'	-.063	.063	.878***	.169	-.134	.128	.762
7	'Monitoring by independent state institutions ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'	-.012	.058	-.068	.094	.814***	.203	.653
8	'Possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny of the decision-making process and review of policies ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'	.028	.169	.001	.106	.437*	.176	.205
<i>Eigenvalues</i>		1.498		0.868		3.316		
<i>Variance explained (%)</i>		18.73		10.85		41.45		

Factor loading matrix. $N = 148$; *Est.* = factor loading (estimator), *S.E.* = standard error, h^2 = communality; factor loadings $>.40$ are displayed in bold; * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.

III. Regression Results for Individual Dimensions of Democratic Governance

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
Participation	Cooperation	.195 (.102)	.194 (.105)[†]	.004 (.977)	.437 (.168)**	
	Admin.		-.137 (.103)	-.145 (.103)	-.145 (.103)	-.153 (.105)
	Socialization					
	Stay abroad		-.112 (.108)	-.350 (.165)*	.350 (.165)*	-.092 (.108)
	Foreign media		-.187 (.131)	-.137 (.129)	-.137 (.129)	-.138 (.129)
	Previous programs		.237 (.109)*	.228 (.107)*	.228 (.107)*	.242 (.111)*
	Coop x 1: stay abroad			.433 (.212)*		
	Coop x 1: no stay abroad				-.433 (.212)*	
	R^2	.028	.098	.130	.130	.072
	AIC	426.984	1014.939	1011.245	1011.245	848.356
	$Log Likelihood$	- 210.492	-500.470	-497.623	-497.623	- 418.178
	N	133	121	121	121	121
Transparency	Cooperation	-.113 (.075)	-.103 (.079)			
	Admin.		-.005 (.083)			.007 (.080)
	Socialization					
	Stay abroad		-.041 (.083)			-.045 (.082)
	Foreign media		.013 (.097)			-.014 (.094)
	Previous programs		.204 (.080)*			.201 (.080)*
	R^2	.016	.071			.056
	AIC	351.751	935.610			767.177
	$Log Likelihood$	- 172.875	-460.805			- 377.589
	N	132	121			121

III. Regression Results ... (continued)

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
	Cooperation	.049 (.684)	.004 (.128)			
Accountability	Admin.		-.034 (.116)			-.034 (.116)
	Socialization					
	Stay abroad		-.072 (.121)			-.072 (.119)
	Foreign media		.063 (.166)			.064 (.154)
	Previous programs		.253 (.117)*			.253 (.117)*
	R^2	.001	.044			.044
	AIC	437.730	994.128			834.799
	$Log Likelihood$	- 215.865	-490.064			- 411.399
	N	126	117			117

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; [†] $p \leq .065$, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$.*

IVa. Regression Results - The Twinning ‘Customs Duty’

		(1)	(2)
Democratic Governance	Twinning	-.142 (.122)	-.183 (.129)
	Admin. Socialization		-.053 (.073)
	Stay abroad		-.055 (.074)
	Foreign media		-.047 (.089)
	Previous programs		.232 (.077)**
	<i>R</i> ²	.013	.111
	<i>AIC</i>	159.791	671.043
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-76.895	-328.522
	<i>N</i>	110	103
Participation	Twinning	-.246 (.221)	-.344 (.211)
	Admin. Socialization		-.156 (.100)
	Stay abroad		-.095 (.105)
	Foreign media		-.129 (.128)
	Previous programs		.247 (.108)*
	<i>R</i> ²	.017	.103
	<i>AIC</i>	299.589	897.002
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-146.794	-441.501
	<i>N</i>	133	121
Transparency	Twinning	-.234 (.145)	-.206 (.153)
	Admin. Socialization		.003 (.081)
	Stay abroad		-.050 (.081)
	Foreign media		-.002 (.091)
	Previous programs		.199 (.079)*
	<i>R</i> ²	.030	.081
	<i>AIC</i>	238.359	832.669
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-116.180	-409.334
	<i>N</i>	132	121
Accountability	Twinning	-.037 (.144)	-.083 (.157)
	Admin. Socialization		-.039 (.115)
	Stay abroad		-.075 (.118)
	Foreign media		.072 (.153)
	Previous programs		.256 (.116)*
	<i>R</i> ²	.000	.045
	<i>AIC</i>	313.781	886.563
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-153.891	-436.282
	<i>N</i>	126	117

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01.*

IVb. Regression Results – The Twinning ‘Competition’

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)	(3d)
Democratic Governance	Twinning	.256 (.122)*	.207 (.088)*	.444 (.098)***	.161 (.091) [†]	.037 (.097)	.037 (.076)***
	Admin.		-.038 (.074)	-.034 (.074)	-.034 (.074)	-.045 (.074)	-.045 (.074)
	Socialization						
	Stay abroad		-.055 (.074)	-.062 (.076)	-.062 (.076)	-.075 (.078)	.075 (.078)
	Foreign media		-.068 (.089)	-.055 (.091)	.055 (.091)	-.053 (.089)	-.053 (.089)
	Previous programs		.230 (.077)**	.233 (.077)**	.233 (.077)**	.231 (.077)**	.231 (.077)**
	Twin. x 1: foreign media			-.283 (.130)*			
	Twin. x 1: no foreign media				.283 (.130)*		
	Twin. x 1: stay abroad					.341 (.125)**	
	Twin. x 1: no stay abroad						-.341 (.125)**
	<i>R</i> ²	.027	.105	.110	.110	.116	.116
	<i>AIC</i>	104.445	615.834	405.490	405.490	464.593	464.593
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-49.222	-300.917	-194.745	-194.745	-224.296	-224.296
	<i>N</i>	110	103	103	103	103	103
Participation	Twinning	.150 (.124)	.188 (.154)				
	Admin.		-.144 (.105)				
	Socialization						
	Stay abroad		-.095 (.108)				
	Foreign media		-.147 (.130)				
	Previous programs		.254 (.112)*				
	<i>R</i> ²	.004	.077				
	<i>AIC</i>	233.461	837.395				
Transparency	Twinning	.172 (.141)	.067 (.118)				
	Admin.		.009 (.080)				
	Socialization						
	Stay abroad		-.045 (.082)				
	Foreign media		-.014 (.095)				
	Previous programs		.203 (.081)*				
	<i>R</i> ²	.010	.058				
	<i>AIC</i>	172.917	774.551				
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-83.459	-380.276				
	<i>N</i>	132	121				

IVb. Regression Results ... (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)	(3d)
Twinning	.259 (.203)	.201 (.183)	-.038 (.188)	.664 (.273)*		
Admin.		-.025 (.115)	-.038 (.116)	-.038 (.116)		
Socialization						
Stay abroad		-.070 (.118)	-.120 (.122)	.120 (.122)		
Foreign media		.061 (.153)	.083 (.150)	.083 (.150)		
Previous programs		.262 (.117)*	.268 (.016)*	.268 (.116)*		
Twin. x 1: stay abroad			.702 (.331)*			
Twin. x 1: no stay abroad				-.702 (.331)*		
R^2	.011	.051	.070	.070		
AIC	282.603	586.600	702.004	702.004		
$Log Likelihood$	-138.302	-421.300	-343.002	-343.002		
N	126	117	117	117		

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; [†] $p \leq .08$, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.

IVc. Regression Results – The Twinning ‘Health Control’

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)
Democratic Governance	Twinning	-.032 (.071)	.014 (.081)		
	Admin.		-.047 (.076)		
	Socialization				
	Stay abroad		-.051 (.079)		
	Foreign media		-.062 (.089)		
	Previous programs		.222 (.078)**		
	<i>R</i> ²	.001	.089		
	<i>AIC</i>	215.990	728.534		
Participation	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-104.995	-357.267		
	<i>N</i>	110	103		
	Twinning	-.054 (.101)	.063 (.122)	-.169 (.168)	.266 (.149)
	Admin.		-.161 (.110)	-.139 (.108)	-.139 (.108)
	Socialization				
	Stay abroad		-.098 (.111)	-.185 (.131)	.185 (.131)
	Foreign media		-.143 (.130)	-.181 (.132)	-.181 (.132)
	Previous programs		.246 (.113)*	.251 (.111)*	.251 (.111)*
Transparency	Twin. x 1: stay abroad			.435 (.217)*	
	Twin. x 1: no stay abroad				-.435 (.217)*
	<i>R</i> ²	.001	.073	.094	.094
	<i>AIC</i>	357.259	959.985	900.858	900.858
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-175.630	-472.992	-442.429	-442.429
	<i>N</i>	133	121	121	121
	Twinning	-.133 (.090)	-.155 (.090)[†]	.144 (.131)	-.208 (.103)*
	Admin.		.020 (.080)	.011 (.080)	.011 (.080)
Transparency	Socialization				
	Stay abroad		-.028 (.083)	-.008 (.086)	-.008 (.086)
	Foreign media		-.002 (.097)	.045 (.107)	-.045 (.107)
	Previous programs		.193 (.080)**	.188 (.080)**	.188 (.080)**
	Twin. x 1: foreign media			-.352 (.174)*	
	Twin. x 1: no foreign media				.352 (.174)*
	<i>R</i> ²	.013	.076	.089	.089
	<i>AIC</i>	280.348	878.066	735.132	735.132
Transparency	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-137.174	-432.033	-359.566	-359.566
	<i>N</i>	132	121	121	121

IVc. Regression Results ... (continued)

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)
Accountability	Twinning	.075 (.122)	.127 (.133)		
	Admin.		-.048 (.118)		
	Socialization				
	Stay abroad		-.084 (.122)		
	Foreign media		.055 (.158)		
	Previous programs		.262 (.117)*		
	R^2	.002	.050		
	AIC	377.908	950.349		
	$Log Likelihood$	-185.954	-468.174		
	N	126	117		

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; [†] $p \leq .06$, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$.*

IVd. Regression Results – The Twinning ‘Environment’

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)
Democratic Governance	Twinning	.179 (.081)*	.163 (.094)	-.248 (.117)*	.195 (.096)*
	Admin. Socialization		-.015 (.072)	-.018 (.072)	-.018 (.072)
	Stay abroad		-.039 (.076)	-.025 (.078)	-.025 (.078)
	Foreign media		-.093 (.092)	-.120 (.097)	.120 (.097)
	Previous programs		.208 (.077)**	.217 (.077)**	.217 (.077)**
	Twin. x 1: foreign media			.442 (.161)**	
	Twin. x 1: no foreign media				-.442 (.161)**
	<i>R</i> ²	.030	.111	.122	.122
	<i>AIC</i>	195.533	695.634	493.798	493.798
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-94.767	-340.634	-238.899	-238.899
	<i>N</i>	110	103	103	103
Participation	Twinning	.438 (.091)***	.401 (.103)***		
	Admin. Socialization		-.093 (.102)		
	Stay abroad		-.094 (.104)		
	Foreign media		-.178 (.127)		
	Previous programs		.183 (.107)		
	<i>R</i> ²	.092	.140		
	<i>AIC</i>	360.973	948.425		
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-177.487	-467.213		
	<i>N</i>	133	121		
Transparency	Twinning	.035 (.101)	.121 (.084)	-.043 (.081)	.393 (.148)**
	Admin. Socialization		.026 (.081)	.012 (.079)	.012 (.079)
	Stay abroad		-.040 (.082)	-.106 (.089)	.106 (.089)
	Foreign media		-.029 (.095)	.012 (.096)	.012 (.096)
	Previous programs		.186 (.080)*	.174 (.079)*	.174 (.079)*
	Twin. x 1: stay abroad			.436 (.169)**	
	Twin. x 1: no stay abroad				-.436 (.169)**
	<i>R</i> ²	.001	.067	.100	.100
	<i>AIC</i>	286.390	860.657	778.467	778.467
	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-140.195	-423.329	-381.233	-381.233
	<i>N</i>	132	121	121	121

IVd. Regression Results ... (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)
Accountability				
Twinning	-.104 (.150)	-.205 (.170)		
Admin.		-.069 (.122)		
Socialization				
Stay abroad		-.071 (.119)		
Foreign media		.100 (.154)		
Previous programs		.277 (.123)*		
R^2	.004	.057		
AIC	369.190	922.311		
$Log Likelihood$	-181.595	-454.156		
N	126	117		

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.*

REFERENCES

- Al-Arkoubi, Khadija and Willy McCourt (2004) "The Politics of HRM: Waiting for Godot in the Moroccan Civil Service", in: *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 15(6): 978-95.
- Albrecht, Holger and Oliver Schlumberger (2004) "'Waiting for Godot': Regime Change Without Democratization in the Middle East", in: *International Political Science Review* 25(4): 371-92.
- Ashton, Catherine (2011): "Listening to the Revolution", in: *The International Herald Tribune*, 26.02.2011.
- Atkinson, Carol (2010) "Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980-2006", in: *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6: 1-22.
- Baker, Randall (2002) (ed.) *Transitions from Authoritarianism. The Role of the Bureaucracy*. London: Praeger.
- Beetham, David (1999) *Democracy and Human Rights*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Berger, Morroe (1957) *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt: A Study of the Higher Civil Service*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Beyers, Jan (2005) "Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials", in: *International Organization* 59(4): 899-936.
- Bovens, Mark (2007) "New Forms of Accountability and EU-Governance", in: *Comparative European Politics* 5: 104-20.
- Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder (2006) "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses", in: *Political Analysis* 14: 63-82.
- Braumoeller, Bear F. (2004) "Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms", in: *International Organization* 58: 807-20.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W. (2000) "Democratic Governance and Sectoral Policy Reform: Tracing Linkages and Exploring Synergies", in: *World Development* 28(4): 601-15.
- Brown, Timothy A. (2006) *Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Brownlee, Jason (2007) *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Burnell, Peter and Oliver Schlumberger (2010) "Promoting Democracy – Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes", in: *Contemporary Politics* 16(1): 1-15.
- Campbell, Donald T. and Julian C. Stanley, Julian C. (1966) *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*. Chicago, IL.: Rand McNally.
- Campbell, Patricia J. (2003) "Morocco in Transition: Overcoming the Democratic and Human Rights Legacy of King Hassan II. ", in: *African Studies Quarterly* 7 (1).

- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001) "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change", in: *International Organization* 55(3): 553-88.
- _____ (2003) "'Going Native' in Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions", in: *Comparative Political Studies* 36(1/2): 209-31.
- _____ (2005) "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework", in: *International Organization* 59(4): 801-26.
- Collins, Debbie (2003) "Pretesting Survey Instruments: An Overview of Cognitive Methods", in: *Quality of Life Research* 12: 229-38.
- Cooper, Chris and Mikael Johansen (2003) *An Evaluation of Completed Twinning Projects. A Report Presented to the National Contact Points' Meeting*. Brussels.
- Coston, Jennifer M. (1998) "Administrative Avenues to Democratic Governance: The Balance of Supply and Demand", in: *Public Administration and Development* 18: 479-93.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1971) *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrott (1997) (eds) *Democratization and Authoritarianism in Postcommunist Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dawson, Richard E. and Kenneth Prewitt (1969) *Political Socialization*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Desrues, Thierry and Eduardo Moyano (2001) "Social Change and Political Transition in Morocco", in: *Mediterranean Politics* 6(1): 21-47.
- Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner, and Andreas Schedler (1999) "Introduction", in: Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (eds) *The Self-Restraining State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1-10.
- European Commission (2004) EU/Morocco Action Plan, Annex to Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be adopted by the European Community and its Member States [...] on the implementation of the EU-Morocco Action Plan. COM(2004) 788 final.
- European Commission (2011) Joint Communication [...] A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. COM(2011) 200 final.
- European Court of Auditors (2003) Special Report n° 6/2003 concerning Twinning as a main instrument to support institution-building in Candidate Countries, together with the Commission's replies, in: *Official Journal* C167: 21-45.

- European Union (2009): European Neighborhood Policy – Egypt MEMO/09/179, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/179&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [14.03.2011].
- Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt (2003) “Rationalism versus Constructivism: A Skeptical View”, in: Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage, 52-72.
- Finnemore, Martha (1993) “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy”, in: *International Organization* 47(4): 565-97.
- Flockhart, Trine (2004) “‘Masters and Novices’: Socialization and Social Learning through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly”, in: *International Relations* 18(3): 361-80.
- Fox, Alan (1974) *Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations* London: Faber and Faber.
- Freyburg, Tina, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig, Tatiana Skripka and Anne Wetzel (2009) “EU Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood”, in: *Journal of European Public Policy* 16(6): 916-34.
- , Tatiana Skripka, and Anne Wetzel (2007) “Democracy between the Lines? EU Promotion of Democratic Governance via Sector-Specific Cooperation”. NCCR Democracy Working Paper No. 5. Zurich.
- Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski (2007) “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats”, in: *Comparative Political Studies* 40(11): 1279-301.
- Gheciu, Alexandra (2005) “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe’”, in: *International Organization* 59(4): 973-1012.
- Göbel, Christian and Daniel Lambach (2010) “Accounting for the (In-)Stability of Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa”. Manuscript, APSA Annual Meeting. Toronto.
- Grant, Ruth W. and Robert O. Keohane (2005) “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics”, in: *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 29-43.
- Harders, Cilja (2008) “Analyzing Regional Cooperation after September 11, 2001: The Emergence of a New Regional Order in the Arab World”, in: Cilja Harders and Matteo Legrenzi (eds) *Beyond Regionalism? Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 33-50.
- Holland, Paul W. (1986) “Statistics and Causal Inference”, in: *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 81: 945-60.

- Hooghe, Liesbet (2005) "Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission", in: *International Organization* 59(4): 861-98.
- Hyden, Goran, Julius Court, and Kenneth Mease (2004) *Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence from Sixteen Developing Countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- John, Oliver P. and Veronica Benet-Martínez (2000) "Measurement: Reliability, Construct Validation, and Scale Construction", in: Harry T. Reis and Charles M. Jud (eds) *Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 339-69.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001) "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments", in: *International Studies Quarterly* 45(4): 487-515.
- (2005) "Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe", in: *International Organization* 59(4): 1013-44.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2005) "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004". The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3630. Washington.
- Kramer, Roderick M. (1999) Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions, in: *Annual Review of Psychology* 50: 569-598.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye (1974) "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations", in: *World Politics* 27(1): 39-62.
- Kern, Holger Lutz and Jens Hainmueller (2009) "Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Authoritarian Regimes", in: *Political Analysis* 17: 377-99.
- Kerr, Henry H. (1973) "Changing Attitudes through International Participation: European Parliamentarians and Integration", in: *International Organization* 27(1): 45-83.
- Leib, Ethan and He Baogang (eds) (2006) *The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China*. New York: Palgrave.
- Marsden, Peter V. (1990) "Network Data and Measurement", in: *Annual Review of Sociology* 16: 435-63.
- Marsh, David (1971) "Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions Questioned", in: *British Journal of Political Science* 1(4): 453-65
- Mohamedou, Mohammad-Mahmoud (1999) "The Rise and Fall of Democratization in the Maghreb", in: Paul J. Magnarella (ed.) *Middle East and North Africa: Governance, Democratization, Human Rights*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 209-39.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1993) "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", in: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(4): 473-524.

- Morse, Janice M. (2002) "Principles of Mixed Methods and Multimethod Research Design", in: Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie (eds) *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 189-208.
- Muthén, Linda K. and Bengt O. Muthén (2006): *Mplus User's Guide*, 4. edition, Los Angeles, CA.
- Nye, Joseph S. (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD (2011) Morocco, available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/6/1882353.gif> [11.03.2011].
- Page, Edward C. (1985) *Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power. A Comparative Analysis*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.
- Papadimitriou, Dimitris and David Phinnemore (2003) "Exporting Europeanization to the Wider Europe: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in the Candidate Countries and Beyond", in: *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 3(2): 1-22.
- Pawelka, Peter (2002) "Der Staat im Vorderen Orient: Über die Demokratie-Resistenz in einer Globalisierten Welt", in: *Leviathan* 30(4): 432-54.
- Pérez-Armendáriz, Clarisa and David Crow (2010) "Do Migrants Remit Democracy? International Migration, Political Beliefs, and Behavior in Mexico", in: *Comparative Political Studies* 43(1): 119-48.
- Peterson, John and Elizabeth Bomberg (1999) *Decision-Making in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Pilotte, William and Robert K. Gable (1990) "The Impact of Positive and Negative Item Stems on the Validity of a Computer Anxiety Scale", in: *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 50: 603-10.
- Pollack, Mark A. (1998) "Constructivism, Social Psychology, and Elite Attitude Change. Lessons from an Exhausted Research Program". Manuscript, Conference of Europeanists. Baltimore, MD.
- _____ (2005) "The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections on an Experiment in International Governance", in: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(5): 899-919.
- Presser, Stanley, Mick P. Couper, Judith T. Lessler, Elizabeth Martin, Jean Martin, Jennifer M. Rothgeb, and Eleanor Singer (2004) "Methods for Testing and Evaluating Survey Questions", in: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 68(1): 109-30.
- Raykov, Tenko (2007) "Reliability if Deleted, not 'Alpha if Deleted': Evaluation of Scale Reliability Following Component Deletion", in: *British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology* 60: 201-16.

- Rhodes, Roderick A.W. (2006) "The Sour Laws of Network Governance", in: Fleming, Jenny and Jennifer Dawn Wood (eds.) *Fighting Crime Together: The Challenges of Policing and Security Networks*. Sydney: UNSW Press, 15-35.
- Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropps, and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) (eds) *The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank (2003) "Internationale Sozialisation: Von einem 'erschöpften' zu einem produktiven Forschungsprogramm?" in: Gunther Hellmann, Klaus Dieter Wolf, and Michael Zürn (eds) *Die neuen internationalen Beziehungen. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 401-27.
- _____, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel (2006) *International Socialization in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schlumberger, Oliver (2006) "Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Contexts", in: Dieter Jung (ed.) *Democratization and Development. New Political Strategies for the Middle East*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 33-60.
- Schriesheim, Chester A., Regina J. Eisenbach and Kenneth D. Hill (1991) "The Effect of Negation and Polar Opposite Item Reversals on Questionnaire Reliability and Validity: An Experimental Investigation", in: *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 51: 67-78.
- Scully, Roger (2005) *Becoming Europeans? Attitudes, Behaviour, and Socialization in the European Parliament*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Searing, Donald, Gerald Wright, and George Rabinowitz (1976) "The Primacy Principle: Attitude Change and Political Socialization", in: *British Journal of Political Science* 6(1): 83-113.
- Sijtsma, Klaas (2009) "On the Use, the Misuse, and the Very Limited Usefulness of Cronbach's Alpha", in: *Psychometrika* 74(1): 107-20.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2000) "Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order", in: Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth (eds) *Democratic Governance and International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199-235.
- _____. (2004) *A New World Order*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- United States Agency for International Development, USAID (2011) Morocco, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ane/ma/> [11.03.2011].
- Van Waarden, Frans (1992) "Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks", in: *European Journal of Political Research* 21: 29-52.
- Verba, Sidney (1967) "Democratic Participation", in: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 373(2): 53-78.

- Way, Lucan A. and Steven Levitsky (2007) "Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide", in: *East European Politics and Societies* 21(1): 48-66.
- Wejnert, Barbara (2005) "Diffusion, Development, and Democracy 1800-1999", in: *American Sociological Review* 70(1): 53-81.
- Whitehead, Laurence (1996) "Three International Dimensions of Democratization", in Laurence Whitehead (ed.) *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-25.
- Worthington, Roger L. and Tiffany A. Whittaker (2006) "Scale Development Research. A Content Analysis and Recommendations for Best Practices", in: *The Counseling Psychologist* 34(6): 806-38.
- Youngs, Richard (2001) "European Union Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On", in: *European Foreign Affairs Review* 6: 355-73.
- Zaharchenko, Tatiana R. and Greta Goldenman (2004) "Accountability in Governance: The Challenge of Implementing the Aarhus Convention in Eastern Europe and Central Asia", in: *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 4: 229-51.
- Zerhouni, Saloua (2004) "Morocco: Reconciling Continuity and Change", in: Volker Perthes (ed.) *Arab Elites. Negotiating the Politics of Change*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ., 61-85.